

Robert Gary-Bobo

Sciences Po 2018

Topics in the Theory of Contracts and Incentives

1. Labor Contracts as Self-Enforcing Agreements in Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring.
2. Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts: Combination of Explicit and Implicit Contracts.
3. Theory of Careers 1. Career Concerns.
4. Theory of Careers 2. Promotions.

List of references:

Robert Gibbons and Kevin Murphy (1992), "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence", *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 100, pp 468-505.

George Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin Murphy (1994), "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 109, pp 1125-1156.

Bentley MacLeod, and James Malcomson (1998), "Motivation and Markets", *American Economic Review*, vol. 88, pp 388-411.

Jonathan Levin (2003), "Relational Incentive Contracts", *American Economic Review*, vol. 93, pp 835-857.

Roy Radner (1985), "Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting", *Econometrica*, vol. 53, pp 1173-1198.

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<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/693871>

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