Should low skilled work be subsidized?

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May 12, 2006
Preliminary, comments welcome

\footnote{We have benefited from the comments of Martin Hellwig, Bruno Jullien, Wojciech Kopczuk, Jean-Charles Rochet, Emmanuel Saez, Gilles Saint Paul, Bernard Salanié, and of the participants in the theory seminar in Toulouse.}
Abstract

A number of countries have recently implemented variants of a negative income tax, to push the less skilled members of the economy into work, or to make work pay in comparison with welfare benefits. In most cases, these measures have resulted for the concerned groups in a decrease of the tax rates, that remain positive, rather than in a subsidy, in conformity with the recommendations of the current theory of optimal taxation. Indeed in the Mirrlees setup (continuous labor supply or intensive margin, unobserved productivity, utilitarian planner) the marginal tax rate is non negative at the optimum.

The purpose of the paper is to question this result of the theory. We study economies where it is optimal to have people in the economy work more than in the laissez-faire. We provide an example in the intensive setup. The utilitarian optima in the extensive model seem to exhibit this property quite generally. We hope that these results help towards providing some theoretical foundations for low skilled work subsidy, and extending the scope of welfare to work programs.

JEL classification numbers: H21, H31.

Keywords: optimal taxation, heterogeneity, welfare.
1 Introduction

A number of countries have recently implemented variants of a negative income tax, to push the less skilled members of the economy into work, or to make work pay in comparison with welfare benefits. In most cases, these measures have resulted for the concerned groups in a decrease of the tax rates, that remain positive, rather than in a subsidy (see e.g. CBO (2000) for the United States). This is in conformity with the current recommendations of the theory of optimal taxation. Indeed it is now well established in the Mirrlees setup (continuous labor supply or intensive margin, unobserved productivity, utilitarian planner) that the marginal tax rate is non negative at the optimum (Seade (1977), Seade (1982), Werning (2000), Hellwig (2005)). The purpose of the present paper is to revisit this theoretical result, to question its robustness when there are multiple dimensions of heterogeneity and to draw its implications for labor market distortions. This is done through two examples, one in the intensive setup, the other in the extensive framework.

In fact, early on Diamond (1980), more recently Saez (2002), Beaudry and Blackorby (2004), Boone and Bovenberg (2004), Boone and Bovenberg (2006), Choné and Laroque (2005) and Laroque (2005) have described setups where the positive tax rate result does not hold. A common feature of the (rather different) models used in these works is that labor supply decisions involve a zero-one component, an extensive margin. Furthermore there are typically several (sometimes implicit) dimensions of heterogeneity. These studies exhibit cases where negative tax rates can occur at an optimum. But it is fair to say that their theoretical foundations remain unclear as well as their practical relevance. Also it is important to note that the implications of negative tax rates are quite different in an extensive model and in an intensive model. In the intensive model, they imply that labor supply is distorted upwards compared with the laissez-faire. In the extensive model negative tax rates are mostly related to the shape of the distribution of agents in the economy, and to the best of our knowledge, the previous literature has not studied the extent of labor supply distortions in this setup.

We use a framework which contains as limit cases both the intensive and the extensive models, and allow for multiple dimensions of heterogeneity. We take a very simple separable specification for the agents tastes, in fact much simpler than the standard Mirrlees specification: utility is linear in commodity and for the participating agents labor supply has a constant elasticity with respect to wages. Technically, our line of approach is to look first for properties of all the second best optimal allocations, then restricting the attention to those that are consistent with a utilitarian criterion.

The study of the intensive model follows on the steps of Sandmo (1993), but

\footnote{Indeed Mirrlees (1976) in its Section 4 indicates, along a line that will be pursued further here, that the sign of the marginal tax rate cannot be predicted when the agents in the economy differ along several dimensions of heterogeneity.}
we allow for a general non-linear tax. There are two dimensions of heterogeneity, productivity and a variable opportunity cost of work. The specification however makes it possible to subsume these two dimensions into a single one. We are able to completely characterize the set of second best allocations, including the ones that involve pooling, in line with the general analysis of Jullien (2000). Heterogeneity comes into play in the measurement of the agents’ utilities, which increase with productivity and may either decrease or increase with the work opportunity cost. It is likely to decrease when the cost is associated with poor living conditions (i.e. a handicap); it increases when the cost reflects opportunities outside the legal market (such as gardening at home or black market activities). We find that the Mirrlees result, of positive marginal tax rates, extends here whenever the distribution of opportunity costs is independent of that of productivities, whatever the impact of these costs on the agents utilities. We give an example of optimal negative marginal rates in an economy where agents with low productivities exhibit a large spectrum of opportunity costs, and are better off, the larger their costs. The negative tax rate serves to screen out the agents with large costs, who anyway benefit from working at home or on the black market, in the spirit of the imperfect screening literature (e.g. Akerlof (1978) or Salanié (2002)).

The extensive model has built in several dimensions of heterogeneity, since both differences in productivity and in fixed opportunity cost to work are an essential feature of the model. It also presents technical difficulties because of its intrinsic non convexity. We specifically study the shape of the second best allocations that are consistent with a utilitarian criterion. For simplicity, and for comparison with the intensive case, we restrict our attention to the situation where work opportunity costs have a log-concave distribution and are distributed independently of productivity in the population. To our surprise, we find that all the utilitarian optima in the benchmark model involve upwards labor supply distortions for low productivity workers. The optimal financial incentives to work involve a subsidy: low productivity workers are paid more than their productivity at the optimal allocation. The argument is as follows. In the absence of income effects, the marginal cost of public funds, say $c$, is equal to 1, the social value of transferring 1$ per head to everyone in the population (the population size having been normalized to one). Consider then a small change in the tax schedule in favor of the working agents of (low) productivity $\omega$, sufficiently small not to modify the situation of the other agents, of productivity different from $\omega$. It has two effects: it gives more money to the agents that are already working, and it brings into the labor force some pivotal agents previously unemployed. Under utilitarianism (and not full redistribution!), the social value of a marginal transfer to the working agents of productivity $\omega$ is larger than that of a transfer to the

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2With a similar aim as ours, Beaudry and Blackorby (2004) have studied a model with several ‘true’ dimensions of heterogeneity. This makes the study of the optimal taxes much more complicated.
whole population, and in the benchmark model has a social value larger than \( c \) per dollar transferred: the first effect is positive. The second effect comes from the pivotal agents that enter the labor force. They are essentially indifferent between working and not working, and their contribution is the difference between their productivity \( \omega \) and their pay. For the first order condition to hold, this difference must be negative: pay has to be larger than productivity. The result appears to hold in a number of cases, and it would be of interest to study more precisely its domain of validity.

To summarize, non negative optimal marginal tax rates, which obtain under utilitarianism in the Mirrlees model, appear to be non robust to the presence of heterogeneity, apart from that affecting productivity, in the economy. Then upwards distortions in labor supply may be useful for screening purposes. In our simple intensive model, this occurs in a rather special case, when the low income people are thought to be well off agents who shirk. In the extensive model, under utilitarianism, the less skilled workers have typically their work subsidized: they work more than in the laissez-faire, and the utilitarian optimal allocations have more ‘working poors’ than the competitive equilibrium. All this should the subject of further research.

2 The setup

2.1 The model

We consider an economy with a continuum of agents of measure 1. The agents supply labor, in quantity \( h, h \geq 0 \), to produce an undifferentiated commodity in quantity \( \omega h = y \). Here \( \omega, \omega \geq 0 \), denotes the idiosyncratic productivity of the agent, and \( y \) her before tax income.

After government transfers, the after tax income of the agent is denoted \( R(y) \), where the non linear function \( R : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) summarizes the action of the tax authority. The tax function \( T \) corresponding to \( R \) is defined by

\[
T(y) = y - R(y),
\]

so that a negative marginal tax rate corresponds to a derivative \( R'(y) \) larger than one.

Faced with the function \( R \), the typical agent choses her labor supply by maximizing a choice index

\[
u(R; \alpha, \beta, \omega) = \max_{h \geq 0} \begin{cases} 
R(0) + \alpha & \text{if } h = 0 \\
R(\omega h) - \beta v(h) & \text{if } h > 0
\end{cases}
\]

We say that an agent participates in the labor market when she choses a positive labor supply, so that her choice index is given by the bottom line of the formula.
This specification is adopted for convenience, but is in line with a number of works in the literature. The choice index of the agent is linear in commodity (labor supply does not depend on the income level). The penility of labor is described with the function \( v(h) \), which we specify as

\[
v(h) = \frac{h^{1+\frac{1}{e}}}{1 + \frac{1}{e}}.
\]

The parameter \( e \), \( e \geq 0 \), common to all the agents in the economy, is the elasticity of the labor supply of the participating agents with respect to wage. In the limiting case \( e = 0 \), when \( R \) is non decreasing, everyone supplies one unit of labor when participating: we obtain the extensive model.

On top of her productivity \( \omega \), an agent is characterized by the non negative idiosyncratic parameters \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \). The former, \( \alpha \), the fixed opportunity cost of work, represents the gain of being at home, not doing any work at all. When \( \alpha \) is equal to zero, we fall back on the intensive model. The latter, \( \beta \), the variable opportunity cost of work, scales the penility of labor. We note \( \theta = (\alpha, \beta, \omega) \).

The distribution of agents’ characteristics has support \( \Theta \) in \( \mathbb{R}_3^+ \) and is known to the government. The cumulative distribution function is \( H \).

### 2.2 Second best optimality and utilitarianism

Given a function \( R \), an allocation \( y_R \) is a function from \( \Theta \) into \( \mathbb{R}_+ \) such that, for all \( \theta \), \( y_R(\theta) = \omega h \) for some \( h \) that maximizes the program \([1]\) of the agent of characteristics \( \theta \). In this paper, all allocations are associated in this way with some function \( R \). To alleviate notations, we shall drop the index \( R \) when this does not create ambiguity. The allocation \( y_R \), and the associated function \( R \) are feasible when

\[
\int_{\Theta} [y_R(\theta) - R(y_R(\theta))] \, dH(\theta) = 0.
\]

An allocation \( y_{R^*} \) and the associated transfer function \( R^* \) are second best optimal when there does not exist another feasible allocation which gives at least as much utility to everyone in the economy and strictly more to a subgroup of agents of positive measure. By definition, \( R^* \) is second best optimal if and only if the program

\[
\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\max_R \int_{\Theta} [y_R(\theta) - R(y_R(\theta))] \, dH(\theta) \\
u(R; \theta) \geq u(R^*; \theta) \quad \text{for all } \theta \in \Theta
\end{array} \right.
\]

has solution \( R^* \) and value 0. Provided an appropriate differentiability structure is put on the set of functions \( R \), a version of the standard necessary condition for optimality then holds\(^3\) (see proof in the Appendix):

\(^3\)We thank Bruno Jullien and Martin Hellwig for pointing out an error at this stage in earlier versions of the paper. Lemma \([1]\) holds for more general specifications of the utility function than \([1]\), in fact for any model such that \( u(R, \theta) \) is increasing in \( R \).
Lemma 1. Consider a second best optimum $R^*$ such that the maximizer and the constraint in (2) are Fréchet differentiable with respect to $R$ at $R^*$. Then there exists a non negative measure $\Pi$ on $\Theta$, such that the function $R^*$ is a local extremum of the Lagrangian

$$
\mathcal{L} = \int_{\Theta} [u(R; \theta)d\Pi(\theta) + (y_R(\theta) - R(y_R(\theta)))dH(\theta)].
$$

(3)

Note that by quasi-linearity of the utilities, the solution to the program where a constant $a$ is added to $R^*$ is $a + R^*$, with $y_{R^*}$ equal to $y_{a+R^*}$. Therefore

$$
\int_{\Theta} d\Pi(\theta) = 1,
$$

and $\Pi$ is a probability measure. Furthermore, when looking for all the second best allocations, it will be convenient to ignore the feasibility condition, which fixes the intercept of the function $R^*$, and choose a simpler normalization condition, such as $\inf_{\theta \in \Theta} u(R^*, \theta) = 0$.

To simplify the presentation, in most of the paper, we shall work under the assumption that the measure $\Pi$ is absolutely continuous with respect to the distribution of the agents' characteristics. Then, for any measurable set $A$,

$$
\Pi(A) = \int_{A} \pi(\theta)dH(\theta),
$$

and $\pi(\theta)$ is interpreted as the social weight of the agents of characteristics $\theta$. In fact, the results that we obtain are typically valid for a general measure, possibly with discrete masses: they cover in particular the Rawlsian optimum, which corresponds to a unit mass on the agents with the lowest utility level.

Second best optimality is an ordinal concept, which does not depend on the particular representation of the agents' utilities, up to an increasing transformation. For comparison with the literature, we also study the subset of allocations that obtain under utilitarianism, a cardinal notion. Let $\Psi(u(R, \theta), \theta)$ be the utility that society assigns to the agent $\theta$ when her choice index is $u(R, \theta)$. The function $\Psi$ is non decreasing and concave in its first argument (a requirement of consistency with private values). The social value of a marginal transfer to agent $\theta$, $\Psi'_u(u(R, \theta), \theta)$, depends in an arbitrary way on its second argument: for instance society may dislike the agents who like staying at home (decreasing in $\alpha$), or would like to compensate people with a large penibility of labor (increasing

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4It may be worth emphasizing that we stick here to a purely welfarist viewpoint. We do not consider situations where the social objective includes moral considerations other than the effects of policies on individual utilities, as discussed in Sen (1982) and Kaplow and Shavell (2001).
in $\beta$). The second best allocation is consistent with utilitarianism when the associated weights are proportional to the marginal social utility for some admissible function $\Psi$

$$\pi(\theta) = \frac{\Psi'(u(R, \theta), \theta)}{\int_{\Theta} \Psi'_u(u(R, \theta), \theta) \, dH(\theta)}.$$  \hfill (4)

When $\Psi$ is allowed to vary with the parameter $\theta$, it is easy to see that any second best optimal allocation can be supported with a well chosen $\Psi$: consistency with utilitarianism is not a binding restriction.

When the function $\Psi$ does not depend on its second argument, the standard situation studied in the optimal tax literature, the condition binds and can be written as

$$\pi(\theta_1) > \pi(\theta_2) \text{ if and only if } u(R, \theta_1) < u(R, \theta_2).$$

This is illustrated on the stylized Figure [I] which sketches an hypothetical economy with two types of agents in the plan of their choice indices $(U_1, U_2)$. The second best frontier is the black curve $ABCD$, while the subset of the frontier that is consistent with utilitarianism is made of the union of $AB$ and $CD$, where $B$ and $D$ are the points where the frontier has slope $-1$: it must have a tangent of slope smaller than 1 in absolute value below the 45 degree line, and larger than 1 above the 45 degree line.

Our purpose is to find properties of the second best optimal functions $R$, in particular when the social weights are consistent with utilitarianism.
3  The intensive case

This situation obtains when the fixed opportunity cost of labour $\alpha$ is equal to zero for all the agents in the economy. The specification then coincides with that described in Atkinson (1990) for empirical purposes. Diamond (1998) also studies the shape of the optimal tax rates in a quasi linear in consumption model, where labor supply elasticity is not constant. The closest in spirit predecessor of our analysis is Broadway, Marchand, Pestieau, and del Mar Racionero (2002) who have quasi linearity in hours worked with heterogeneous preferences for leisure, but work in a discrete setup, with four different states.

3.1  A change of variable

It turns out that there is a convenient reformulation of the problem, introducing the choice index of the participating agents as a variable, instead of the function $R$. Indeed, in general when there are several dimensions of heterogeneity (productivity, peniblity of labor) and the government has only one dimension of observation (income), a major difficulty is to identify the set of idiosyncratic shocks that are associated with a given level of income, which typically depends on the announced transfer function. Here, the specification of the choice index and of the way shocks enter the model allow to reduce the problem to a single dimension of heterogeneity from the start, independently of the function $R$.

**Proposition 1.** 1. Consider a function $R : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. Let

$$V(\gamma) = \max_{y \geq 0} \left\{ R(y) - \gamma \frac{y^{1+\frac{\epsilon}{\beta}}}{1+\frac{\epsilon}{\beta}} \right\},$$

where

$$\gamma = \frac{\beta}{\omega^{1+\frac{\epsilon}{\beta}}}.\n$$

$V$ is a convex nonincreasing function, which satisfies

$$V'(\gamma) = -v(y_R(\gamma)),$$

whenever it is differentiable, so that $R(y_R(\gamma)) = V(\gamma) - \gamma V'(\gamma)$.

2. Conversely, to any convex nonincreasing function $V$ corresponds a real function $\tilde{R} : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ through

$$\tilde{R}(q) = \min_{\gamma \geq 0} V(\gamma) + \gamma q.$$

$\tilde{R}(\cdot)$ is concave non decreasing in its argument. If $V$ has been derived from a function $R$ as in 1., $\tilde{R}(\cdot)$ coincides with the function $R \circ v^{-1}$ when $R \circ v^{-1}$ is concave, which implies that $R$ itself is non decreasing.
We shall denote $\Gamma$ the support of the distribution of $\gamma$, with $\gamma \geq 0$ and $\bar{\gamma}$ its lower and upper (possibly infinite) bounds. From the point of view of the agents the only thing that matters is the level $V(\gamma)$ of their choice index, and Proposition 1 shows that without loss of generality we can consider any convex nonincreasing function. Also, without loss of generality, the government can restrict the $R$ functions to be non-decreasing and such that $R \circ v^{-1}$ be concave.

### 3.2 Optimal tax

The change of variable, from $R$ to $V$, is extremely useful. The admissible functions $V$ belong to the convex cone of convex nonincreasing functions on $\mathbb{IR}_+$, and the second best program (2) can be written

$$\max \int [v^{-1}(-V') + \gamma V' - V] \, dG(\gamma)$$

subject to the constraints $V$ convex and $V \geq V^*$. The maximizer in (5) is concave in $(V,V')$. Theorem 1 of Section 8.3 of Luenberger (1969) yields the existence of the Lagrange multiplier for the inequality constraint.\(^5\) Thanks to the convexity of the problem, the first order conditions are sufficient for an optimum. Denoting $\Pi(\gamma)$, with a slight confusion of notation, the cdf of the probability measure which represents the Lagrange multiplier, the Lagrangian can be written as

$$\mathcal{L} = \int V \, d\Pi(\gamma) + \int [y - (V - \gamma V')] \, dG(\gamma).$$

By integration by parts (apply Lemma [A.2](#appendix) in Appendix with $F = V$, $f = V'$, $y = \Pi$, $y(\emptyset) = 0$ and $y(\bar{\theta}) = 1$), the Lagrangian becomes

$$\mathcal{L} = \int (y + \gamma V') \, dG(\gamma) + \int V'(G - \Pi) \, d\gamma,$$

where $V' = -v(y)$. Note that it depends only on the allocation $y$, i.e. the derivative of the choice index (and not on its level $V$). We have proven the following Lemma:

**Lemma 2.** An allocation $y$ is second best optimal if and only if there exists a nondecreasing function $\Pi : [\gamma, \bar{\gamma}] \rightarrow [0,1]$ such that $V'(\gamma) = -v(y)$ is the solution to

$$\max \mathcal{L} = \int (v^{-1}(-V') + \gamma V') \, dG(\gamma) + \int V'(G - \Pi) \, d\gamma,$$

on the set of nondecreasing and negative function $V'$.

\(^5\)We apply Luenberger’s result with $\Omega$ the convex cone of convex functions. The inequality constraint $V \geq V^*$ is obviously differentiable in $V$.\n
The set of second best optimal allocations is easy to describe when the distribution of heterogeneity is continuous, i.e.

**Assumption 1 (Continuous distribution).** The parameter $\gamma$ is distributed in the economy with the c.d.f. $G$ of support $[\underline{\gamma}, \overline{\gamma}]$, $0 < \underline{\gamma} < \overline{\gamma} < \infty$. Furthermore $G$ has a continuous positive density $g$.

We have

**Proposition 2.** Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. A non negative decreasing function $y(\gamma)$ defined on $\Gamma$ is a second best allocation if and only if the function

$$\Pi(\gamma) = \begin{cases} G(\gamma) - g(\gamma) \left[ \frac{1}{v'(y(\gamma))} - \gamma \right] & \text{for } \gamma \in [\underline{\gamma}, \overline{\gamma}] \\ 1 & \text{for } \gamma = \overline{\gamma} \end{cases}$$

is non negative and non decreasing.

Then both $y(\gamma)$ and $\Pi(\gamma)$ are continuous on $(\gamma, \overline{\gamma})$. There is no distortion at the top when $\Pi$ is continuous at $\overline{\gamma}$: $\overline{\gamma} v'(y(\overline{\gamma})) = 1$. There is no distortion at the bottom when $\Pi(\gamma) = 0$: $\gamma v'(y(\gamma)) = 1$. The social weights $\pi(\gamma)$ associated with this allocation are the (Stieltjes) derivative of $\Pi(\gamma)$.

**Proof:** I) Necessity. Since $y$ is increasing, $V'$ is strictly positive and a necessary condition for optimality is that the pointwise derivative of the Lagrangian in Lemma 2 be equal to zero. This yields the condition of the Proposition.

Continuity is proved as follows. Since $y(\gamma)$ is decreasing, any discontinuity has to be downwards. That creates a downwards discontinuity for $-1/v'(y)$ and therefore for $\Pi$, a contradiction with the fact that $\Pi$ is non decreasing. The no distortion properties are straightforward consequences of the first order condition.

II) Sufficiency. The measure $\Pi$ defined in the proposition is an adequate multiplier for the second best program. The function

$$V(\gamma) = \int_{\gamma}^{\overline{\gamma}} v'(y(\gamma)) dG(\gamma)$$

is convex non increasing. It maximizes the Lagrangian of Lemma 2 since its derivative is a pointwise maximum of a concave function of $V'$.

**Remark 3.1.** Here is a general version of Proposition 2 with proof in the Appendix, which allows for pooling (i.e. $y$ may be constant on some interval). In what follows, a pooling interval is a maximal interval where $y$ is constant.
Figure 2: Social weights and negative marginal tax rates

**Proposition 3.** Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. A nonnegative nonincreasing function $y(\gamma)$ defined on $\Gamma$ is a second best allocation if and only if there exists a nonnegative and nondecreasing function $\Pi(\gamma)$ with values in $[0,1]$ such that

$$\int_2^{\gamma} \left\{ G(\tilde{\gamma}) - g(\tilde{\gamma}) \left[ \frac{1}{v'(y(\gamma))} - \tilde{\gamma} \right] \right\} d\tilde{\gamma} \geq \int_2^{\gamma} \Pi(\tilde{\gamma}) d\tilde{\gamma} \quad (6)$$

for all $\gamma$, and (6) is an equality at any $\gamma$ where $y$ is decreasing.

Proposition 2 has established the existence of a one-to-one relationship between distributions of social weights and second best allocations without pooling. This property does not hold any more when we allow for the possibility of pooling (case of Proposition 3): different distributions may, in general, give rise to the same second best allocation.

More precisely, pooling occurs when the $\Pi$ function of Proposition 2 has decreasing parts. It turns out that pooling intervals can be generated by mass points in the distribution of social weights, but, in general, they can also be generated by (many) smooth distributions of weights. In the appendix, we explain geometrically how to construct the (set of) cumulative distribution functions $\Pi$ associated with a given allocation $y$. 
3.3 Utilitarianism and marginal tax rates

The program of the typical consumer yields the first order condition

\[ R'(y) = \gamma v'(y), \]

or, using the equality \( R' = 1 - T' \)

\[ \frac{T'(y)}{1 - T'(y)} = \frac{1}{\gamma v'(y)} - 1. \]

Let \( p_I(\gamma) \) be the average value of the social weights of all the agents with idiosyncratic characteristics smaller than \( \gamma \):

\[ p_I(\gamma) = \frac{\Pi(\gamma)}{G(\gamma)} = \frac{1}{G(\gamma)} \int_{\gamma}^{\gamma} \pi(x) dG(x). \]

Using Proposition 2, we get an expression of the optimal tax rate as a function of the distribution of the heterogeneity in the population and of the social weights:

\[ \frac{T'(y(\gamma))}{1 - T'(y(\gamma))} = \frac{G(\gamma)}{\gamma g(\gamma)} (1 - p_I(\gamma)). \] (7)

Under Assumption 1, \( G/g \) is well defined and positive for all \( \gamma \) larger than \( \gamma \), and the marginal tax rate has the same sign as \( 1 - p_I(\gamma) \).

Consider the standard Mirrlees case where \( \beta \) is constant across the population, and \( \omega \) has a continuous distribution on \([\omega, \bar{\omega}]\). Then

\[ \gamma = \frac{\beta}{\omega^{1 + \frac{1}{\beta}}} \quad \bar{\gamma} = \frac{\beta}{\bar{\omega}^{1 + \frac{1}{\beta}}}, \]

and productivity, as well as utility, decreases with \( \gamma \). Utilitarianism is equivalent to have social weights which increase with \( \gamma \), which in turn implies that \( p_I(\gamma) \) increases with \( \gamma \). Since \( p_I(\gamma) = 1, p_I(\gamma) < 1 \) for all \( \gamma < \gamma \), and we (fortunately) get the standard result: the marginal tax rate is always positive, but for the boundaries of the domain where it is equal to zero.

The situation can change when there are other dimensions of heterogeneity, which non trivially act on the agents utility levels. Suppose as an illustration that the utility is of the shape \( \Psi[V(\gamma), \beta] \), with \( \Psi \) concave in its first argument, i.e. \( \Psi'_V \) decreasing in \( V \). When \( \Psi'_V \) does not depend on \( \beta \), the standard argument applies and optimal marginal tax rates are non negative. But \( \Psi'_V \) can be decreasing in \( \beta \): this is the case when the utility of the agent is a concave transformation of \([V(\gamma) + \beta K] \), where \( K > 0 \) and the additive term \( \beta K \) stands for the ‘home’ production of the agent supposed to increase with her variable cost to work on the market. It can also be increasing in \( \beta \), when a negative \( K \) in the above formula
stands for a handicap: larger $\beta$'s are associated with a lower quality of life, on top of the direct market effects. Let

$$
\tilde{\pi}(\gamma, \beta) = \frac{\Psi'_V[V(\gamma), \beta]}{\int \Psi'_V[V(\gamma), \beta] dH(\theta)},
$$

so that the weights of interest to characterize the optimal allocation and tax schedule are

$$
\pi(\gamma) = \int \tilde{\pi}(\gamma, \beta) dG(\beta | \gamma),
$$

where $G(\beta | \gamma)$ is the distribution of $\beta$ conditional on the parameter $\gamma$. There are a variety of situations where tax rates are non negative:

**Proposition 4.** Assume that $\Psi'_V[V, \beta]$ is decreasing in $V$, increasing (resp. decreasing) in $\beta$ and that the distribution of $\beta$, conditional on $\gamma$, is first order stochastically increasing (resp. decreasing) in $\gamma$.

Then the weights $\pi(\gamma)$ are increasing and marginal tax rates are non negative.

**Proof:** Let

$$
f(a, b) = \int \tilde{\pi}(a, \beta) dG(\beta | b).
$$

$f$ is increasing in $a$, since $\tilde{\pi}$, proportional to $\Psi'_V[V(a), \beta]$, is. It is increasing in $b$ by first order stochastic dominance. It follows that $\pi(\gamma) = f(\gamma, \gamma)$ is also increasing in its argument.

Since $\beta = \gamma/\omega^{1+1/e}$, it is plausible that $G(\beta | \gamma)$ be first order stochastically increasing in $\gamma$. Then if $\Psi'_V$ is increasing in $\beta$, i.e. larger opportunity costs are due to a handicap, the optimal marginal tax rates are non negative.

As a counterpart to the above proposition, it is easy to build examples with negative marginal tax rates, say when $\Psi'_V$ decreases with $\beta$ while the conditional distribution of $\beta$ given $\gamma$ increases. Consider the following economy. At the lowest wage rate $\omega$, there are a variety of $\beta$'s, a continuous distribution on $[\beta, \bar{\beta}]$. For all the wage rates above the minimum, a continuous distribution on $(\omega, \bar{\omega}]$, there is a unique value of $\beta$, equal to $\bar{\beta}$. In terms of $\gamma$'s, we have:

$$
\gamma = \frac{\beta}{\omega^{1+1/e}} \quad \gamma_m = \frac{\beta}{\omega^{1+1/e}} \quad \bar{\gamma} = \frac{\bar{\beta}}{\omega^{1+1/e}}.
$$

The agent $\gamma$ is the most productive with the smallest opportunity cost to work. All the agents of the segment $[\gamma, \gamma_m]$ differ only by their productivities. All the agents in $[\gamma_m, \bar{\gamma}]$ have the same low productivity $\omega$, but have different, increasing, opportunity costs. Figure 2 represents in a stylized way a possible profile of $\pi(\gamma)$, when the social weights are decreasing in $\beta$. Following standard utilitarianism, $\pi$ is increasing on $[\gamma, \gamma_m]$; it is supposed to decrease further on, the home production
effect more than compensating the mechanical increase in $\gamma$ as $\beta$ rises. The agent with the largest social weight is the $\gamma_m$ person with lowest productivity and opportunity cost to work. The associated function $p_I(\gamma)$, which measures the average height of $\pi(x)$ for $x$ smaller than $\gamma$, is also represented: $p_I(\gamma)$ increases whenever it lies under the graph of $\pi$, decreases when it is above the graph, and has an horizontal tangent when it crosses the $\pi$ curve. Also, we know that $p_I(\bar{\gamma}) = 1$. In the situation depicted on Figure 2, all the agents in the segment $AB$ face negative tax rates. As noted by Saez (2002), page 1054, negative marginal tax rates at the bottom of the wage distribution as here can only occur if the social weight of the $\gamma$ agent, smallest productivity, largest work opportunity cost, is smaller than the average social weight $\bar{\gamma}$. 

4 The extensive model

We now turn to the study of second best optimal allocations in the extensive model.

4.1 Social weights and optimal taxes

The extensive model obtains as a limit case of model (1) when the elasticity $e$ tends to zero: then the function $v$ tends to zero for all $h$ smaller than 1, and to $+\infty$ for all $h$ larger than 1. If the agent participates, she is indifferent supplying any quantity of labor smaller than 1, since the variable opportunity cost $\beta v(h)$ then is equal to zero. It follows that the after tax income schedule $R(y)$ can be taken to be non decreasing without loss of generality. Then, when she participates, the agent supplies one unit of labor and her before tax income $y$ is equal to $\omega$. As a consequence, before tax income can take any value in the support $\Omega$ of productivity, as well as the value 0. The function $R$ has to be defined on $\{0\} \cup \Omega$.

Let $D(y) = R(y) - R(0)$ denote the financial incentive to work for an income $y$. To apply Lemma 1, the set of admissible functions $D$ is the cone of nondecreasing functions in the space of integrable functions that satisfy $D(0) = 0$, and to ensure differentiability, we posit

Assumption 2. For all $\omega$, the distribution of opportunity costs of work $\alpha$, conditional on $\omega$, is continuous with support $[\alpha(\omega), \bar{\alpha}(\omega)]$, $\bar{\alpha}(\omega) > \alpha(\omega) \geq 0$, and cumulative distribution function $F(\alpha|\omega)$. Its probability distribution function $f(\alpha|\omega)$ is positive everywhere on its support.

\footnote{Indeed the function $p_I$ has to decrease towards one, and therefore must lie above the graph of $\pi$.} \footnote{Take any, possibly sometimes decreasing, function $\tilde{R}(y)$. Let $R(y) = \max_{y \geq z} \tilde{R}(z)$. The agents have the same behavior under $R$ and $\tilde{R}$.}
The choice index of the typical agent, taken from (1), is
\[ u(R; \theta) = R(0) + \max[\alpha, D(\omega)]. \]
An agent works whenever \( \alpha \) is less than or equal to \( D(\omega) \). This implies
\[ \int_{\Theta} [y_R(\theta) - R(y_R(\theta))] \, dH(\theta) = \int_{\alpha \leq D(\omega)} [\omega - D(\omega)] \, dH(\theta) - R(0), \]
and the Lagrangian (3) becomes
\[ L = \int_{\Theta} \left\{ \max[\alpha, D(\omega)] \, d\Pi(\theta) + [\omega - D(\omega)] \right\} \]
After simple manipulations, the objective becomes
\[ L = \int_{\Theta} \pi(\theta) \alpha \, dH(\theta) + \int_{\omega} \int_{\alpha \leq D(\omega)} \left\{ [D(\omega) - \alpha] \, d\Pi(\theta) + [\omega - D(\omega)] \right\} \]
It then follows that

Lemma 3. Under Assumption 2, a necessary condition for an income tax schedule \( R(\cdot) \) to be second best optimal is that there exists a probability measure of cdf \( \Pi(\theta) \) such that the incentive schedule \( D(\omega) = R(\omega) - R(0) \) maximizes
\[ \int_{\omega} \left\{ [\omega - D(\omega)] F(D(\omega) | \omega) \, dG(\omega) + 1_{\omega \leq D(\omega)} \int_{\omega \leq D(\omega)} [D(\omega) - \alpha] \, d\Pi(\theta) \right\} \]
on the set of integrable and non-decreasing functions \( D(\cdot) \), such that \( D(0) = 0 \).

When \( \Pi(\theta) \) is absolutely continuous with respect to \( H(\theta) \), with pdf \( \pi(\theta) \), under Assumption 2, the criterion can be rewritten as
\[ \int_{\omega} L(D(\omega); \omega) \, dG(\omega) \] (8)
where
\[ L(D; \omega) = [\omega - D] F(D | \omega) + \int_{\omega} [D - \alpha] \pi(\theta) \, dF(\alpha | \omega). \]

For efficiency, the agents that are indifferent between working and not working should be put to work when their productivity is larger than the incentive cost to the government, \( \omega > D(\omega) \) and left on the dole when the inequality is in the other direction, \( \omega < D(\omega) \). To avoid an overburden of notations, in the following equations, we suppose that all those agents, typically a set of measure zero, are working.
Since under Assumption 2, $L(\alpha(\omega); \omega)$ is equal to zero, the program can be restricted to the domain of non-decreasing functions $D(\cdot)$, satisfying $D(\omega) \geq \alpha(\omega)$.

Unfortunately, contrary to the intensive case, the function $L$ is not a concave function of $D$. Nevertheless, at any point $\omega$ where the solution is strictly increasing and larger than $\alpha(\omega)$, it satisfies the first order condition for a pointwise maximum:

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial D}(D; \omega) = [\omega - D]f'(D|\omega) - F(D|\omega)[1 - p_E(D|\omega)] = 0,$$

where $p_E(D|\omega)$ is the average social weight of the agents of productivity $\omega$ and of work opportunity cost smaller than $D$.

The expression of $\partial L/\partial D$ has a direct economic interpretation: the first term $[\omega - D]f'(D|\omega)$ is the gain in government income obtained from the new workers that participate because of the increase in $D$; the second term $F(D|\omega)[1 - p_E(D)]$ is the loss on the existing workers $F(D)$ which depends on their social weights (and indeed is a social gain for those of weights larger than 1).

The tax supported by the workers of productivity $\omega$ is $T(\omega) = \omega - D(\omega) - R(0)$, so that the first order condition can be rewritten as

$$\omega - D(\omega) = R(0) + T(\omega) = \frac{F[D(\omega)|\omega]}{f[D(\omega)|\omega]}[1 - p_E(D(\omega)|\omega)].$$

This equation is strikingly similar to (7), which describes optimal taxes in the intensive model. However, the formal similarity hides important differences. In

9 Whenever at the optimum $L(D(\omega); \omega) = 0$, $D(\omega)$ is indeterminate and can take any value less than or equal to $\alpha(\omega)$, without changing the objective: the condition $D(0) = 0$ can always be satisfied.

10 The second order condition is

$$\frac{\partial^2 L}{\partial D^2}(D; \omega) = [\omega - D]f''(D|\omega) - (2 - \pi(D, \omega))f(D|\omega) < 0.$$

In general, there may exist several solutions to the first order condition, corresponding to local maxima or minima.

11 As in the intensive case, the optimum may involve pooling, with regions where $D$ stays constant because of the monotonicity condition. In a pooling interval $[\omega_1, \omega_2]$, whenever $D$ does not hit the lower bound $\max_{\omega \in [\omega_1, \omega_2]} \alpha(\omega)$, the first order conditions become

$$\int_{\omega_1}^{\omega_2} \frac{\partial L}{\partial D}(D; \omega) dG(\omega) = 0$$

and

$$\int_{\omega_1}^{\omega_2} \frac{\partial L}{\partial D}(D; \omega) dG(\omega) \leq 0$$

for all $\omega_1 \leq \omega \leq \omega_2$. 

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the intensive model this is the marginal rate of taxation that appears on the left hand side, while here it is the level of tax. The right hand sides look the same, but again this is deceptive. The average weight here, \( p_F(D(\omega) | \omega) \), is that of the subset of the employed \( (\alpha \leq D(\omega)) \) agents of productivity equal to \( \omega \). In the intensive model it is the average weight of the agents of parameter \( \beta/\omega^{1+1/e} \) smaller than the current \( \gamma \), i.e. of larger productivity or smaller opportunity cost to work. Social weights larger than 1, corresponding to a group of people whose average social weight is larger than that of society as a whole, which are associated with negative rates in the intensive model, here correspond to a financial incentive \( D(\omega) \) larger than \( \omega \). In both models the beneficiaries have their labor supplies distorted upwards, compared with laissez-faire.

**Remark 4.1.** A limit case of some technical interest is the situation where everyone has the same work opportunity cost, say \( \alpha_0 \), so that Assumption 2 does not hold. This situation is studied by Homburg (2002), with a general utility function. Then (5) is to be maximized over \( D \), \( D \) non decreasing, with

\[
L(D; \omega) = \{ \omega - \alpha_0 \pi(\omega) + D[\pi(\omega) - 1] \} 1_{D \geq \alpha_0}.
\]

Under quasi linearity, existence of a (finite) solution requires conditions on the weights. Typically there is a lot of pooling. Consider only the situation where \( \pi(\omega) \) is non increasing in \( \omega \): this is the case of interest under utilitarianism, since \( D(\omega) \) has to be non decreasing, and utility is presumably increasing in \( D \). Recall that the sum of weights is normalized to 1. Then the first order condition for a pooling equilibrium (see footnote 11), i.e.:

\[
\int_\omega \left[ \pi(x) - 1 \right] dG(x) \leq 0,
\]

for all \( \omega \), is satisfied, and simple calculations show that the optimum has \( D(\omega) = \alpha_0 \) for all \( \omega \), all agents are indifferent between working or not, with the agents of productivities larger than \( \alpha_0 \) at work. Labor supply is efficient. The utilitarian optimum does not leave any surplus to the workers and everyone is treated equally. Heterogeneity in the form of some dispersion of work opportunity costs give more scope for redistribution, based on the unknown value of \( \alpha \).

**Remark 4.2.** At any second best allocation, the utility of an agent depends on her characteristics \((\alpha, \omega)\), the incentives to work \( D \) that she faces, and the (uniform) transfer from the government \( R(0) \). This makes it easier to look for a utilitarian optimum than in the intensive case, where the allocation depended on the whole function \( R \). Indeed, building on (4), the weights are proportional to \( \Psi_u[u(\alpha, \omega, D, R(0)), \alpha, \omega] \) and can be written as

\[
\hat{\pi}(\alpha, \omega, D) = \frac{\Psi'_u[u(\alpha, \omega, D, R(0)), \alpha, \omega]}{\int_{\alpha, \omega} \Psi'_u[u(\alpha, \omega, D(\omega), R(0)), \alpha, \omega] dH(\alpha, \omega)}.
\]

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This (primal) formulation can be used instead of the (dual) \( \pi(\alpha, \omega) \). Indeed one can let either

\[
p_E(D|\omega) = \begin{cases} \pi(\alpha(\omega), \omega) & \text{for } D = \alpha(\omega) \\ \frac{1}{F(D|\omega)} \int_{\alpha(\omega)}^{D} \pi(\alpha, \omega) dF(\alpha|\omega) & \text{for } D > \alpha(\omega), \end{cases}
\]

or

\[
p_E(D|\omega) = \begin{cases} \hat{\pi}(\alpha(\omega), \omega, \alpha(\omega)) & \text{for } D = \alpha(\omega) \\ \frac{1}{F(D|\omega)} \int_{\alpha(\omega)}^{D} \hat{\pi}(\alpha, \omega, D) dF(\alpha|\omega) & \text{for } D > \alpha(\omega). \end{cases}
\]

All the analysis below is valid in both cases.

### 4.2 Typical shapes of optimal tax schemes

The extensive model has imbedded at its heart two dimensions of heterogeneity, which cannot be reduced to one. This gives a lot of leeway to get results of the type ‘any kind of tax function can occur’ manipulating (10); one can play with the distribution \( F(\alpha|\omega) \), as in Choné and Laroque (2005) for a Rawlsian planner. To be more constructive, we first posit a set of natural assumptions on the distribution of characteristics and on the shape of the social weights, which seem to fit the underlying structure of the model. In Section 4.2.1, properties of the tax schedules are derived under these assumptions. Then Section 4.2.2 shows that in the standard model, under the distribution assumptions, a utilitarian planner would have social weights that conform with the assumptions. Finally Section 4.2.3 discusses limits and possible extensions of the analysis.

For comparison with the literature on the intensive model, we put restrictions on the distribution of the agents characteristics. First, we do not want the correlation between productivity and the opportunity cost of work to play a role, and in the main analysis we assume independence of the two distributions: \( F(\alpha|\omega) \) does not depend on \( \omega \). It simplifies the exposition to suppose that the lower bound of productivity is not larger than the lower bound of the opportunity cost to work. Also we suppose that the distribution of heterogeneity is well behaved. Formally, in this section, on top of Assumption 2, we assume

**Assumption 3.** The pdf \( F(\alpha|\omega) \) of the work opportunity cost \( \alpha \) is independent of productivity. Furthermore \( \ln(F(\alpha)) \) is concave on its support \((\alpha, \overline{\alpha})\), and \( \alpha > \omega \).

Two properties of the social weights turn out to be useful in the analysis. The first one is formalized in the following assumption:

**Assumption 4.** The average weight of the employed agents \( p_E(D|\omega) \) is a function \( p_E(D) \) independent of productivity. It is continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing for \( D \) in \((\alpha, \overline{\alpha})\), non increasing for \( D \) larger than \( \overline{\alpha} \).
The second property is related to a threshold for the financial incentive to work, equal to the value $D_m$ which makes the average social weight of the employed agents equal to the marginal cost of public funds, here $1$. Formally

**Definition 1.** Let $D_m$ be the smallest root of the equation $p_E(D) = 1$ if any, with $D_m = \alpha$ if $p_E(D) < 1$ for all $D$, and $D_m = +\infty$ when $p_E(D) > 1$ for all $D$.

The location of $D_m$ with respect to the support of the distribution of work opportunity costs $[\alpha, \bar{\alpha}]$ is an important determinant of the shape of the optimal tax schedule, as the following proposition already indicates:

**Proposition 5.** Suppose that the average social weight of the unemployed agents is larger than or equal to that of the workers. Under Assumption 4, if $D_m \geq \alpha$, then at the optimum everyone works, the incentives to work are maximal: for all $\omega$, $D(\omega) \geq D_m$ and $p_E(D(\omega)) = 1$.

**Proof:** The proposition relies on the fact that the social weights sum up to 1:

$$\int_{\Omega} [F(D(\omega))p_E(D(\omega)) + (1 - F(D(\omega)))p_U] \, dG(\omega) = 1,$$

(11)

where $p_U$ denotes the average social weight of the unemployed. An optimum maximizes $\int \omega L(D(\omega); \omega) \, dG(\omega)$ over the set of non decreasing functions $D(.)$. Now for $D \geq \bar{\alpha}$,

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial D}(D, \omega) = p_E(D) - 1.$$  

It follows that it is never optimal to choose a value of $D$, $D$ larger than $\bar{\alpha}$, such that $p_E(D) < 1$. Consequently at the optimal allocation, under Assumption 4, $p_E(D(\omega))$ is larger than or equal to 1 for all $\omega$'s. The left hand side of (11) is the arithmetic average of terms all at least equal to 1. For the equality to hold, they must all be equal to 1: as a consequence, $p_E(D(\omega)) = 1$ for all $\omega$, which implies that $D(\omega) \geq D_m \geq \alpha$. Everybody works, since the incentives to work are larger than the maximal opportunity cost.

Typically, a redistributive government puts as much weight on the unemployed as on the workers. Then when $D_m \geq \alpha$, which probably can only occur in rich economies with high productivities, Proposition 5 shows that the optimal allocation exhibits pooling, everyone receiving a very high wage $D(\omega)$, possibly larger than productivity. For simplicity, in most of what follows, we shall limit ourselves to the (more realistic) situations where $D_m$ is smaller than $\bar{\alpha}$.

### 4.2.1 Properties of the tax schemes

We are now in a position to describe the qualitative properties of the optimal tax schedule. The first proposition deals with all non pooling equilibria, the next ones provide a more precise characterization of the optimum.
Proposition 6. Consider an economy satisfying Assumptions 2 to 4. Suppose that the optimum $D(\omega)$ is strictly increasing in the region $\bar{\alpha} > D(\omega) > \alpha$ (no pooling). Then in this region:

1. For $\omega \geq D_m$, the financial incentive to work $D(\omega)$ is smaller than before tax income $\omega$: labor supply is distorted downwards compared to laissez-faire. Furthermore the marginal tax rate is nonnegative.
2. For $\omega \leq D_m$, the financial incentive to work $D(\omega)$ is larger than before tax income $\omega$: labor supply is distorted upwards compared to laissez-faire.

Proof: Since by assumption the optimal schedule is (strictly) increasing, the first order condition (10) for a pointwise maximization holds in the region

$$\omega - D(\omega) = \frac{F[D(\omega)]}{f[D(\omega)]} [1 - p_E(D(\omega))].$$

Then $\omega \geq D_m$ if and only if $1 \geq p_E(D_m)$.

When $D$ is larger than $D_m$, using Assumption 4 the right hand side of the above equation, $[1 - p_E(D)]F(D)/f(D)$, is increasing as the product of two nonnegative increasing functions. This implies that $\omega - D(\omega)$ is an increasing function of $\omega$: the marginal tax rate is nonnegative.

A possible shape of the optimal incentive schedule is drawn on Figure 3 which obtains in the cases described in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Consider an economy that satisfies Assumptions 2 to 4, with a finite $D_m$, $D_m \leq \bar{\alpha}$.

Assume that

\[ M(D) = D + \frac{F(D)}{f(D)}[1 - p_E(D)] \]

is strictly increasing for $\alpha \leq D \leq D_m$.

Then there is no pooling at the optimum for $\alpha \leq \omega \leq M(\bar{\alpha})$. The optimal incentives $D(\omega)$ are uniquely defined for all $\omega$ such that $M(\bar{\alpha}) \geq \omega \geq \alpha$, and are solution to the equation

\[ M(D(\omega)) = \omega, \]

on this interval. Furthermore $D(\omega)$ is an increasing function of $\omega$ on $[\alpha, M(\bar{\alpha})]$ which satisfies

\[ D(\alpha) = \alpha, \]

\[ D(\omega) \geq \omega \text{ whenever } D \leq D_m. \]

Finally, when $\bar{\alpha}$ is finite, $D(\omega)$ is constant, equal to $\bar{\alpha}$, for $\omega$ larger than $M(\bar{\alpha})$.

Proof: Note that $M(D)$ is increasing for $D > D_m$, since the last term in its expression is the product of two nonnegative positive non decreasing functions.

We look for the function $D(\omega)$ which maximizes $\int_\omega L(D(\omega); \omega) \, dG(\omega)$. We have

\[ \frac{\partial L}{\partial D}(D; \omega) = \begin{cases} f(D)[\omega - M(D)] & \text{for } \bar{\alpha} \geq D \geq \alpha \\ p_E(D) - 1 & \text{for } D > \bar{\alpha}. \end{cases} \]

At the lower end of the domain, when $\bar{\alpha} > \alpha$:

\[ \frac{\partial L}{\partial D}(\alpha; \omega) = (\omega - \alpha)f(\alpha) \geq 0. \]

The preceding computations imply that, under the monotonicity assumption of $M(D)$, the function $L(\cdot; \omega)$ has a single maximum in the interval $[\alpha, \bar{\alpha}]$, which is the unique root $\delta(\omega)$ of the equation $M(D) = \omega$ when $\omega \leq M(\bar{\alpha})$, and is equal to $\bar{\alpha}$ for $\omega \geq M(\bar{\alpha})$. On the half line $[\bar{\alpha}, +\infty)$, $L(\cdot; \omega)$ also has a single maximum, which is equal to $\max(\bar{\alpha}, D_m)$, and is decreasing whenever $D_m$ is smaller than $\bar{\alpha}$.

Following Proposition 5 we focus on the case $D_m \leq \bar{\alpha}$. Then the function $L(\cdot; \omega)$ has a unique global maximum $D(\omega)$ for all $\omega$. It is equal to $\delta(\omega)$ for $\omega$ less than $M(\bar{\alpha})$, and to $\bar{\alpha}$ for larger $\omega$'s. This point wise maximization yields a non decreasing function $D(\omega)$, and therefore corresponds to the global optimum. The location of $D(\omega)$ with respect to the 45 degree line is a straightforward consequence of the shape of $M(D)$. □
Figure 3 illustrates the two foregoing propositions in the ‘well-behaved’ situation. The financial incentives to work are a continuous increasing function of productivity. Under Assumptions 2 to 4 there is a low skilled region, $\alpha \leq \omega \leq D_m$, where labor supply is distorted upwards, while for higher productivities labor is taxed and the marginal tax rate is positive. In the more restricted case of Proposition 7 the marginal tax rate is negative for low enough productivities (indeed, since $D(\alpha) = \alpha$ and $D(\omega) > \omega$ in a neighborhood, $D'$ has to be larger than one in the region). Of course, if one is interested subsidizing low skilled work, the significance of these results hinges on the extent of the region $[\alpha, D_m]$. Under utilitarianism, in a benchmark model, we next show that it is indeed non empty: $D_m > \alpha$.

4.2.2 Benchmark model

The properties of the social weights that underlie the foregoing propositions are satisfied under utilitarianism in a natural benchmark model. Consider the parameter $\alpha$ as an incidental cost of work (and not as a benefit in case of not working). The utility of the typical agent is

$$\Psi[u(R, \theta) - \alpha] = \Psi[R(0) + \max(0, D(\omega) - \alpha)],$$

for some increasing concave function $\Psi$. Then the unemployed agents are the worse off agents in the economy and, given $R(0)$, the social weights consistent with utilitarianism are of the form $\tilde{\pi}(D - \alpha)$, where

$$\tilde{\pi}(x) = \frac{\Psi'[R(0) + \max(0, x)]}{\int_{\alpha, \omega} \Psi'[R(0) + \max(0, D(\omega) - \alpha)]dH(\alpha, \omega)}.$$

The weights do not depend on $\omega$. Concavity of the utility function implies that $\tilde{\pi}(x)$ is decreasing for positive $x$, and $\tilde{\pi}(x)$ is equal to $\tilde{\pi}(0)$ for all negative $x$.

The average social weight of the employed agents $p_E(D)$ decreases (Assumption 4) in the benchmark model. This feature may seem natural to a utilitarian, but in fact it depends both on the welfare criterion and on the shape of the distribution of $\alpha$. A simple differentiation yields

$$p'_E(D) = \frac{f(D)}{F(D)}[\tilde{\pi}(0) - p_E(D)] + \frac{1}{F(D)} \int_{\alpha}^{D} \tilde{\pi}'(D - \alpha)dF(\alpha).$$

An increase in $D$ increases the wealth of all the already employed agents, and therefore decreases their average social weights (the second term), but it brings into employment new blood, formerly unemployed with a high social weight (the first term). In the benchmark model, the former effect dominates:

12It is similar to Figure IIa in Saez (2002), who discusses from a more applied perspective the occurrence of negative marginal tax rates.
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, Assumption 4, i.e. $p_E(D)$ is decreasing, holds in the benchmark model.

Proof: The continuous differentiability of $p_E(D)$ is straightforward. We first show that it is decreasing. For $D > \alpha$, this is a direct consequence of the monotonicity of $\pi$. For $D$ in the support of $F$, we have

$$F(D)^2 p'_E(D) = \left[ \tilde{\pi}(0)f(D) + \int_\alpha^D \tilde{\pi}'(D - \alpha)f(\alpha)d\alpha \right] F(D) - f(D) \int_\alpha^D \tilde{\pi}(D - \alpha)f(\alpha)d\alpha.$$ 

So $p'_E \leq 0$ is equivalent to

$$\tilde{\pi}(0) + \frac{1}{f(D)} \int_\alpha^D \tilde{\pi}'(D - \alpha)f(\alpha)d\alpha \leq \frac{1}{F(D)} \int_\alpha^D \tilde{\pi}(D - \alpha)f(\alpha)d\alpha. \quad (12)$$

For $\alpha \leq D$, we have, thanks to the log-concavity of $F$

$$\frac{f(\alpha)}{f(D)} \geq \frac{F(\alpha)}{F(D)}.$$

Since $\tilde{\pi}' \leq 0$, we have

$$\tilde{\pi}(0) + \frac{1}{f(D)} \int_\alpha^D \tilde{\pi}'(D - \alpha)f(\alpha)d\alpha \leq \tilde{\pi}(0) + \frac{1}{F(D)} \int_\alpha^D \tilde{\pi}'(D - \alpha)f(\alpha)d\alpha = \frac{1}{F(D)} \int_\alpha^D \tilde{\pi}(D - \alpha)f(\alpha)d\alpha$$

which gives $\tilde{\pi}(0)$.

In the benchmark model, also the average weight of the unemployed agents is equal to $\tilde{\pi}(0)$, so that, following Proposition 5, we typically have $\alpha < D_m < \alpha$. Furthermore, more importantly, subsidizing low skilled labour seems to be the norm:

Proposition 8. In the benchmark model, under Assumptions 2 and 3, if $D_m = \alpha < \bar{\alpha}$, then at the optimum allocation nobody works and incentives to work are minimal: $D(\omega) = \alpha$ for all $\omega$.

Proof: The property is a simple consequence of the fact that the social weights sum up to 1:

$$\int_\Omega [F(D(\omega))p_E(D(\omega)) + (1 - F(D(\omega)))\tilde{\pi}(0)] dG(\omega) = 1, \quad (13)$$

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Figure 4: The extensive model: a possible shape of optimal financial incentives to work with a uniform distribution of work opportunity costs

since in the benchmark model all the unemployed agents have the same weight \( \tilde{\pi}(0) \), here also equal to \( p_E(\alpha) = p_E(D_m) = 1 \). From Lemma 4, the weights strictly decrease with \( D \), and all the weights on the left hand side of (13) are at most equal to 1. They must therefore be all equal to 1, i.e. \( p_E(D(\omega)) = 1 \) for all \( \omega \). The strict monotonicity of \( p_E(D) \) yields the desired result.

Under utilitarianism, in the benchmark model, apart from the special situation where incentives to work are constant and equal to the minimum opportunity cost of work, it is optimal to subsidize low skilled work, at least when there is no bunching (Proposition 6).

One can examine situations more complicated than the ones described in Proposition 7 or Figure 3. Specifically, the function \( M(D) \) may very well be non increasing for \( D < D_m \), in which case the first order condition \( \omega = M(D) \) typically has several solutions. The proof of Proposition 7 goes through by selecting the solution \( D(\omega) \) associated with the global maximum of \( L(D;\omega) \), provided this selection is increasing in \( \omega \). The shape of the incentive curve in the region below \( D_m \) then could look quite different, for instance having \( D(\alpha) > \alpha \) and possibly exhibiting upward discontinuities at solution switches. This is illustrated in the following example (proof in the Appendix):

**Proposition 9.** Consider a benchmark economy satisfying Assumptions 2 and 3. Suppose that the opportunity cost \( \alpha \) is uniformly distributed on \([\alpha, \overline{\alpha}]\) and that \( \underline{\alpha} < D_m < \overline{\alpha} \).
Then $D(\omega)$ is increasing and concave whenever some agents of productivity $\omega$ work, i.e. on the set $\{\omega | D(\omega) > \alpha\}$. Moreover:

1. If $\tilde{\pi}(0) \leq 2$, the conditions of Proposition 7 are verified, $D(\alpha) = \alpha$ and $D'_u(\alpha) = 1/(2-\tilde{\pi}_0) > 1$. At the optimum, none of the agents of productivity smaller than $\alpha$ work.

2. If $\tilde{\pi}(0) > 2$, there exists $\omega_0$, $\omega \leq \omega_0 < \alpha$, such that $D(\omega) > \alpha$ for all $\omega \geq \omega_0$ and $D(\omega) \leq \alpha$ for productivities smaller than $\omega_0$. There is an upwards discontinuity in the incentives to work at $\omega_0$.

The situation where the social weights of the unemployed agents are high ($\tilde{\pi}(0) > 2$) is shown on Figure 4. None of the agents with very low productivities, $\omega < \omega_0$, work. But for all $\omega$ larger than or equal to $\omega_0$, a fraction of the agents do some work. In fact the upwards distortion to labor supply here is particularly strong: some agents with productivity smaller than the minimal cost of going to work participate in the labor force. The curve $AB$ on the Figure has equation $M(D) = \omega$: it describes the roots of the first order condition. There is a single root, corresponding to a global maximum of $L$ for $\omega$ larger than $\alpha$, but there are two roots in a part of the low productivity region. The bold line describes the solution. The curve is concave, implying a progressive tax system. It is not always the case that there are negative marginal tax rates at the beginning of the curve, close to $\omega_0$, contrary to the situation when $\tilde{\pi}_0 < 2$ of Figure 3. But there is an upwards discontinuity in the tax schedule at $\omega_0$, indeed an infinite negative marginal tax rate.

Remark 4.3. We have focussed on the shape of incentives in the low productivity region. We do not attempt a full classification of the optimal tax schedules, which satisfy other properties. For instance, Theorem 6 of Choné and Laroque (2005) applies here: all the utilitarian optimal allocations correspond to incentive schemes located above the Rawlsian (Laffer) curve. Theorem 3 of Laroque (2005) also applies: any incentive scheme above the Laffer curve which does not overtax and such that $D(\omega) \leq \omega$ corresponds to a second best optimal allocation. Note that in a benchmark model, from the above results, none of these allocations satisfy a utilitarian criterion. All the utilitarian optimal allocations are such that $D(\omega) > \omega$ for some $\omega$'s, a property discussed in Remark 2.3 of Laroque (2005).

4.2.3 Discussion and extensions

A number of the qualitative features of the solution carry over to the more general model where the utilities of the agents take the form

$$R(0) + \alpha_u + \max(0, D(\omega) - \alpha)),$$

where $\alpha = \alpha_u + \alpha_c$ is the opportunity cost of working, which separates into two terms, $\alpha_u$ the utility of staying at home, and $\alpha_c$ a pure sunk cost of going to work.
The social weight of an agent is therefore of the form \( \tilde{\pi}(\alpha u + \max(0, D(\omega) - \alpha)) \) with, under utilitarianism, \( \tilde{\pi} \) a decreasing function of its argument. As in the intensive example, society puts a low weight on the shirkers who enjoy staying unemployed (high \( \alpha_u \)'s). The average weight of the workers who have a financial incentive equal to \( D \) can then be written

\[
p_E(D) = \frac{1}{F(D)} \int \int_{\alpha_u + \alpha_c \leq D} \tilde{\pi}(D - \alpha_c) dF(\alpha_c, \alpha_u).
\]

The polar case where \( \alpha_c = 0 \) is easy to handle. It yields \( p_E(D) = \tilde{\pi}(D) \) which is decreasing and the previous arguments carry over to this situation. The economy then is quite different from our real world: here the unemployed agents have a higher utility than the employed with the same productivity, and therefore smaller social weights. It follows that, for small \( D \), there is a zone of subsidy where \( p_E(D) \) is larger than 1: \( D_m \) is larger than \( \alpha \).

More generally, a sufficient condition (proved in the Appendix) for \( p_E(D) \) to be a decreasing function of \( D \) is that \( \alpha_u \), conditional on \( \alpha \), first order stochastically increases with \( \alpha \):

**Lemma 5.** Let \( \alpha_u \) and \( \alpha_c \) be nonnegative random variables and \( \alpha = \alpha_u + \alpha_c \). We suppose that \( F \), the c.d.f. of \( \alpha \), is log-concave and that \( \alpha_u \), conditional on \( \alpha \), first-order stochastically increases with \( \alpha \). Then

\[
p_E(D) = \frac{1}{F(D)} \int \int_{\alpha_u + \alpha_c \leq D} \tilde{\pi}(D - \alpha_c) dF(\alpha_c, \alpha_u)
\]

is nonincreasing with \( D \).

Lemma 5 applies when \( \alpha_u \) and \( \alpha_c \) are uniformly or exponentially distributed (computations available upon request).

The driving property that leads to subsidize unskilled work can be restated as follows: the average weight that society puts on the workers of lowest productivity is larger than the marginal value of public funds (with our notations \( p_E(\alpha) > 1 \), or equivalently \( D_m > \alpha \)). This property is satisfied in the benchmark model, as well as in the cases just discussed. Looking more closely (see the proof of Proposition 8), a reason for this fact is the ‘voluntary’ nature of unemployment in these models. The (social) utility level of the unemployed agents is never less (and sometimes higher) than the utility of the pivotal employee. It follows that the average social weight of the low productivity marginal employees is at least as large as that of the unemployed, and therefore the largest in the economy: \( D_m > \alpha \).

\[^{13}\text{It is not sure that } p_E(D) \text{ becomes smaller than 1 for large enough } D \text{ (} D_m \text{ may be equal to } +\infty \). Then the utilitarian criterion would subsidize the workers through a lump sum tax on everyone, } R(0) < 0.\]
In practice, situations where the social weight attached to the unemployed agents is larger than that attached to the employees abound: for instance this would be the case in the presence of ‘involuntary’ unemployment, or, in the spirit of the discussion of the intensive model, when a large opportunity cost to work is associated with a handicap (the marginal social value $\Psi'_u[u, \alpha]$ is increasing with $\alpha$). It is then easy to design economies where the average social weight of the lowest paid workers is smaller than the marginal value of public funds ($D_m = \alpha$). In these economies, after tax income is everywhere smaller than productivity.

Similarly, the analysis has proceeded under the assumption that the social welfare function is smooth, so that the distribution of the agents’ weights has no mass point. When it does have a mass point on the unemployed agents, Proposition 6 does not apply and there is no warranty that $D_m > \alpha$. In particular, the case of a Rawlsian planner who puts a Dirac mass on the least favored agent in the economy corresponds here to a situation where $p_E(D)$ is equal to zero for all $D$, and $D_m = \alpha$. Then the optimal incentive scheme satisfies 1. of Proposition 6: it is everywhere smaller than productivity and the marginal tax rate is always positive. This is in line with the results of Choné and Laroque (2005).

This paper has investigated the optimality of work subsidies in intensive and extensive frameworks, respectively. It would be of interest to know whether and when the subsidy result still holds in the mixed situation where both the extensive and intensive margins operate. Boone and Bovenberg (2004) analyze such a model where the utility is quasi linear (but linear in hours of work, rather than in consumption as here). There is a fixed cost of searching for a job which is constant across the population, and the random outcome of search creates heterogeneity. They find cases where work is subsidized (Section 4.3), but do not characterize them in terms of the economic fundamentals. More work is needed in this area.

References


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The inequality constraints can be written $G(R) \leq 0$, where the map $G$ is given by $G(R) = u(R^*; \theta) - u(R; \theta)$. The Lemma assumes that there exists functional spaces $X$ and $Z$ such that $G : X \rightarrow Z$ is Fréchet differentiable.

Giving one additional dollar to every agent in the economy makes all the inequalities slack, so that $u(R^* + 1; \theta) - u(R^*; \theta) < 0$. It follows that $R^*$ is a regular point of the inequality constraint $G(R) \leq 0$.

Theorem 1 of Section 9.4 of Luenberger (1969) yields the existence of a Lagrange multiplier for the inequality constraints, which is denoted $z^*_0$ in Luenberger’s book and $\Pi$ in the present paper. The multiplier belongs to the positive cone of $Z^*$, the dual of $Z$.

The space $Z$ shall be chosen according to the specifics of each case under consideration. It will depend in particular on the utility function $u$. (For instance, $Z$ can be the space $L^2(\mathbb{R}_+)$ for a particular measure on $\mathbb{R}_+$, see examples below.) In any case, $Z^*$ is included in a space of distributions, whose positive cone is made of nonnegative measure. (This property is shown in Lemma A.1 below). Therefore the multiplier $\Pi$ is a nonnegative measure. 

$^{14}$Actually, Luenberger’s result only requires that $G$ is Gateaux differentiable and that the Gateaux differentials are linear in their increments.
Lemma A.1. Let $\Omega$ be an open subset in $\mathbb{R}^n$, $\mathcal{D}(\Omega)$ the space of $C^\infty$ functions with compact support in $\Omega$ and $\mathcal{D}'(\Omega)$ its dual, the space of distributions on $\Omega$. Let $T \in \mathcal{D}'(\Omega)$ be a positive distribution, that is
\[ <T, \phi > \geq 0 \]
for all nonnegative $\phi \in \mathcal{D}(\Omega)$. Then $T$ is a nonnegative measure on $\Omega$.

Proof of Lemma A.1

Let $I_1, \ldots, I_n$ be compact intervals such that $I = I_1 \times \ldots \times I_n \subset \Omega$. Let $\phi_n \in \mathcal{D}(\Omega)$ be a decreasing sequence, with $\phi_n \geq 0$ and $\lim \phi_n = 1_I$, where $1_I$ is the indicator of $I$. The sequence $(< T, \phi_n >)_n$ being nonnegative and nondecreasing admits a nonnegative limit, denoted $\mu(I)$. By standard arguments, $\mu$ can be extended to any Borel subset of $\Omega$. It is immediate to check the additivity of $\mu$ and that $\mu$ is a nonnegative measure on $\Omega$. The measure $\mu$ can evaluated at any continuous function $\phi$ with compact support in $\Omega$. Of course, it coincides with $T$ for $\phi \in \mathcal{D}(\Omega)$.

Proof of Proposition 1

Part 1 of the Proposition follows from the envelope theorem and from the fact that a maximum of affine functions is convex.

Turning to part 2, we write
\[ V(\gamma) = \max_{q \geq 0} R(v^{-1}(q)) - \gamma q = \max_{q \geq 0} -\gamma q - S(q), \]
where $S(q) = -R(v^{-1}(q))$. Note that the function $V$ can be extended on the real line through $V(\gamma) = +\infty$ for $\gamma < 0$. Equation (14) expresses the fact that $V(-\gamma)$ is the Fenchel-Legendre transform of $S(q)$. As shown in Rockafellar (1970), applying twice this transform yields the original function
\[ S(q) = \max_{\gamma} \gamma q - V(-\gamma) = \max_{\gamma} -\gamma q - V(\gamma) = -\min_{\gamma} \gamma q + V(\gamma) \]
or
\[ R(v^{-1}(q)) = \min_{\gamma} \gamma q + V(\gamma). \]
The minimum can be taken on $\gamma \geq 0$ only, since $V(\gamma) = +\infty$ for $\gamma < 0$, which completes the proof of Proposition 1.

Lemma A.2. Let $f$ be in $L^1([0, \bar{\theta}])$ and $F$ be given by $F(\theta) = \int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} f(t) \, dt$. Let $y$ be a nondecreasing and bounded function on $[0, \bar{\theta}]$.

Then the following integration by parts formula holds
\[ \int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} f(\theta) y(\theta) \, d\theta = F(\bar{\theta}) y(\bar{\theta}) - F(\theta) y(\theta) - \int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F \, dy, \]
where \( \int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} F d\gamma \) is defined as a Riemann-Stieltjes integral, that is, as the limit of
\[
S = \sum_{i=0}^{n} F(t_i) [y(\theta_{i+1}) - y(\theta_i)]
\]
for any mesh \( (\theta_0 = \theta, \theta_1, ..., \theta_n, \theta_{n+1} = \bar{\theta}) \) and any \( t_i \in (\theta_i, \theta_{i+1}) \), when the mesh size \( \max_i |\theta_{i+1} - \theta_i| \) tends to zero.

**Proof of Lemma A.2**

First note that the left hand side of Eq. (15) is well defined since the function \( f \gamma \) is Lebesgue integrable. Note also that the function \( F \) is continuous and almost everywhere differentiable with \( F' = f \) a.e.

A simple computation shows that
\[
S = -F(t_0)y(\bar{\theta}) - y(\theta_1)[F(t_1) - F(t_0)] - ... - y(\theta_n)[F(t_n) - F(t_{n-1})] + F(t_n)y(\bar{\theta})
\]
\[
= -F(t_0)y(\bar{\theta}) + F(t_n)y(\bar{\theta}) - \sum_{i=1}^{n} y(\theta_i) \int_{t_{i-1}}^{t_i} f(t) dt.
\]

By the Lebesgue Theorem, the last sum tends to \( \int_{\theta}^{\bar{\theta}} f(\gamma) y(\gamma) d\gamma \) when the mesh size tends to zero, which (together with the continuity of \( F \)) gives (15).

**Proof of Proposition 3**

Suppose first that \( y \) is second best optimal. The derivative of the Lagrangian is
\[
< d\mathcal{L}, H > = \int \left[ -\frac{1}{v'(y)} + \gamma \right] \dot{H} dG(\gamma) + \int \dot{H} (G - \Pi) d\gamma.
\]
Since the problem is concave, a function \( V \) is the solution if and only if
\[
< d\mathcal{L}, H > \leq 0
\]
for all admissible variations \( \dot{H} \) (i.e., for all functions \( \dot{H} \) such that \( \dot{V} + \varepsilon \dot{H} \) is negative and non decreasing for \( \varepsilon \) small enough).

When \( y \) is strictly decreasing, \( < d\mathcal{L}, H > \) must be zero for all \( \dot{H} \) (since, in that case, \( \dot{V} \) and \( \dot{V} + \varepsilon \dot{H} \) are increasing for small \( \varepsilon \)). It follows that we have in the no pooling region
\[
\Pi(\gamma) = G(\gamma) - g(\gamma) \left[ \frac{1}{v'(y)} - \gamma \right].
\]

In a pooling interval \( [\gamma_i, \gamma_i] \), the functions \( y \) and \( \dot{V} \) are constant and any \( H \) such that \( \dot{H} \) is decreasing is not an admissible test function (since \( \dot{V} + \varepsilon \dot{H} \) is decreasing in \( [\gamma_i, \gamma_i] \)).
It is easy to check that if \( H \) satisfies
\[
\dot{H} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{in } [\gamma_i, \gamma_i'] \\
0 & \text{otherwise},
\end{cases}
\]  
(16)
then \( H \) and \(-H\) are admissible variations, so we must have: \(<d\mathcal{L}, H > = 0\). It follows that
\[
\int_{\gamma_i}^{\gamma_i'} \left\{ G(\gamma) - g(\gamma) \left[ \frac{1}{v'(y)} - \gamma \right] \right\} d\gamma = \int_{\gamma_i}^{\gamma_i'} \Pi(\gamma) d\gamma. \]  
(17)
Now if \( H \) satisfies
\[
\dot{H}(\gamma) = \begin{cases} 
-1 & \text{for } \gamma < \gamma \text{ in } [\gamma_i, \gamma_i'] \\
0 & \text{for } \gamma > \gamma \text{ in } [\gamma_i, \gamma_i']
\end{cases}
\]  
(18)
for some \( \gamma \in [\gamma_i, \gamma_i'] \), then \( H \) is admissible (but \(-H\) is not) and we must have: \(<d\mathcal{L}, H > \leq 0\). It follows that
\[
\int_{\gamma_i}^{\gamma_i'} \left\{ G - g \left[ \frac{1}{v'(y_i)} - \tilde{\gamma} \right] \right\} d\tilde{\gamma} \geq \int_{\gamma_i}^{\gamma_i'} \Pi(\tilde{\gamma}) d\tilde{\gamma}. \]  
(19)
The conditions (17) and (19) are equivalent to the first statement of the proposition. The last statement (geometrical interpretation) follows from the convexity of the function \( \int_{\gamma_i}^{\gamma} \Pi(\tilde{\gamma}) d\tilde{\gamma} \).

The sufficient part follows from the fact that conditions (17) and (19) are equivalent to \(<d\mathcal{L}, H > \leq 0\) for all admissible variations \( H \), since the set of non-increasing functions \( \dot{H} \) on \([\gamma_i, \gamma_i']\) is generated by the set of functions \( H \) satisfying (16) and (18).

Proposition 3 has a geometric interpretation, shown on Figure 5. Let \( Y \) be defined by
\[
Y(\gamma) = \int_{\gamma_i}^{\gamma} \left\{ G(\gamma) - g(\gamma) \left[ \frac{1}{v'(y(\gamma))} - \tilde{\gamma} \right] \right\} d\tilde{\gamma},
\]
and \( Y^* \) be the convex hull of \( Y \). Then \( y \) is second best optimal if and only if the slope of \( Y^* \) is in \([0, 1]\) and \( Y = Y^* \) outside the pooling intervals.

The derivative of \( Y^* \) is the c.d.f. of a social weight distribution for which the allocation \( y \) is optimal. The distribution of social weights \( \Pi \) is unique outside pooling intervals, but it is not unique in the pooling intervals: \( \Pi \) can be the derivative of any convex function below \( Y \) which coincides with \( Y \) outside the pooling intervals.

**Proof of Lemma 3**
We apply a variation on Theorem 1 of Section 9.4 of Luenberger (1969), with $X$ the cone of nondecreasing functions in the space of functions integrable for the measure $dG(\omega)$ and $Z$ the space of integrable functions for the measure $dH(\theta)$. Under Assumption 2, the maximizer being obviously differentiable in $D$, the only point to be checked is the differentiability of the inequality constraints. This is done in Lemma [A.3] below.

**Lemma A.3.** Let $S : L^1(\mathbb{R}_+, G) \to L^1(\mathbb{R}_+^2; H)$ defined by

$$S(D) = R(0) + \max(D, \alpha).$$

Then, under Assumption 2, $S$ is Fréchet-differentiable, with

$$S'(D) = 1_{D > \alpha}.$$

**Proof of Lemma A.3**

We have, for all $\alpha, D$, and for any $h$ in $L^1(\mathbb{R}_+, G)$

$$\frac{1}{|h|} \left| \max(\alpha, D + h) - \max(\alpha, D) - 1_{D > \alpha} h \right| \leq 1. \quad (20)$$

As $|h|$ goes to zero, the left-hand side of (20) tends to zero, as soon as $D \neq \alpha$. Under the assumption of the Lemma, the probability that $D(\omega) = \alpha$ conditionally
on $\omega$ is zero for any $\omega$, so we have $D(\omega) \neq \alpha$ for almost every $(\alpha, \omega)$. It follows from Lebesgue’s dominated convergence Theorem that

$$\frac{1}{|h|_\infty} \iint |\Delta| \, dH(\alpha, \omega)$$

with

$$\Delta = \max(\alpha, D(\omega) + h(\omega)) - \max(\alpha, D(\omega)) - 1_{D(\omega) > \alpha} h(\omega)$$

tends to zero as $|h|$ goes to zero.

**Proof of Lemma 5**

We note $F_c(\alpha_c|\alpha)$ the cdf of the distribution of $\alpha_c$ conditional on $\alpha$, and similarly, with a subscript $u$ that of $\alpha_u$ conditional on $\alpha$. Let

$$K(\alpha) = \int_0^\alpha \tilde{\pi}(D - \alpha_c) \, dF_c(\alpha_c|\alpha)$$

$$= \tilde{\pi}(D - \alpha) + \int_0^\alpha \tilde{\pi}'(D - \alpha_c)F_c(\alpha_c|\alpha) \, d\alpha_c, \quad (21)$$

where we have used $F_c(\alpha_0|\alpha) = 1$.

It is easy to check that $p_E(D)$ nonincreasing is equivalent to

$$K(D) + \frac{1}{f(D)} \int_0^D \int_0^\alpha \tilde{\pi}'(D - \alpha_c) \, dF_c(\alpha_c|\alpha) \, dF(\alpha) \leq \frac{1}{F(D)} \int_0^D K(\alpha) \, dF(\alpha). \quad (22)$$

By log-concavity of $F$, we have (using $\tilde{\pi}' \leq 0$)

$$\frac{1}{f(D)} \int_0^D \int_0^\alpha \tilde{\pi}'(D - \alpha_c) \, dF_c(\alpha_c|\alpha) \, dF(\alpha) \leq \frac{1}{F(D)} \int_0^D \int_0^\alpha \tilde{\pi}'(D - \alpha_c) \, dF_c(\alpha_c|\alpha) \, F(\alpha) \, d\alpha$$

By integration by parts

$$\frac{1}{F(D)} \int_0^D K(\alpha) \, dF(\alpha) = K(D) - \frac{1}{F(D)} \int_0^D K'(\alpha) \, F(\alpha) \, d\alpha.$$

It follows that (22) is implied by

$$\int_0^D \int_0^\alpha \tilde{\pi}'(D - \alpha_c) \, dF_c(\alpha_c|\alpha) \, F(\alpha) \, d\alpha \leq - \int_0^D K'(\alpha) \, F(\alpha) \, d\alpha. \quad (23)$$

By (21), we get

$$K'(\alpha) = \int_0^\alpha \tilde{\pi}'(D - \alpha_c) \, \frac{\partial F_c}{\partial \alpha} \, d\alpha_c.$$
It follows that (23) is equivalent to
\[
\int_0^D \int_0^\alpha \tilde{\pi}'(D - \alpha_c) \left[ f_c(\alpha_c|\alpha) + \frac{\partial F_c}{\partial \alpha} \right] d\alpha_c. F(\alpha) \, d\alpha \leq 0. \quad (24)
\]
which is satisfied when
\[
f_c(\alpha_c|\alpha) + \frac{\partial F_c}{\partial \alpha_c} = \frac{\partial F_c}{\partial \alpha_c} + \frac{\partial F_c}{\partial \alpha} = -\frac{\partial F_u}{\partial \alpha} \geq 0
\]
that is, when \(\alpha_u\) first-order stochastically increases with \(\alpha\).

**Proof of Proposition 9** Let
\[
\lambda = \int_\Theta \Psi[R(0) + \max(0, D(\omega) - \alpha)] \, dH(\theta).
\]
Then
\[
p_E(D) = \frac{1}{\lambda} \int_\alpha^D \Psi[R(0) + D - \alpha] \, \frac{d\alpha}{\alpha - \alpha}. \frac{d\alpha}{\alpha}.
\]
Integrating by parts and substituting yields
\[
M(D) = 2D - \alpha - \frac{1}{\lambda} [\Psi(R(0) + D - \alpha) - \Psi(R(0))].
\]
The function \(M(D)\) is strictly convex in \(D\) and \(M'(\alpha) = 2 - \tilde{\pi}(0)\).

1) Case \(\tilde{\pi}_0 \leq 2\). \(M(D)\) is strictly increasing and Proposition 7 applies. The convexity of \(M(D)\) implies the concavity of \(D(\omega)\).

2) Case \(\tilde{\pi}(0) > 2\). As in the proof of Proposition 7 we consider the pointwise maximum of \(L(D; \omega)\) for \(D \geq \alpha\). Since it is increasing in \(\omega\), it satisfies the monotonicity condition and is the optimum.

Recall that \(L(\alpha, \omega) = 0\). Now,
\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial D}(D; \omega) = (\omega - M(D))f(D) = \frac{1}{\alpha - \alpha} (\omega - M(D))
\]
for \(\alpha \leq D \leq \alpha\) is a concave function of \(D\) which becomes negative for large enough \(D\). We consider three cases:

a. For \(\omega > \alpha\), \(\partial L/\partial D(\alpha; \omega)\) is positive. There is a single zero \(D(\omega)\) of the derivative, solution to \(\omega = M(D)\), which maximizes \(L(D, \omega)\).

b. For \(\omega = \alpha\), \(\partial L/\partial D(\alpha; \omega)\) is equal to zero. \(\partial^2 L/\partial D^2(\alpha; \omega) = (\tilde{\pi}(0) - 2) f(\alpha)\) is positive, so that there is another root \(D(\alpha)\), larger than \(\alpha\) (\(D = \alpha\) is a local minimum of \(L\)). Recall that \(L(\alpha, \omega)\) is equal to zero for all \(\omega\): the maximum is positive.
c. Finally consider $\omega < \alpha$. The function $\frac{\partial L}{\partial D(\cdot;\omega)}$ is linear increasing in $\omega$: when $\omega$ decreases from $\alpha$, its smallest root increases, its largest root (a local maximum of $L$), say $\Delta(\omega)$, decreases, until eventually they both disappear, say at $\omega_1$, $\omega_1 < \alpha$. Note that $L(\Delta(\omega), \omega)$ is an increasing function of $\omega$. Since $L(\alpha, \alpha) = 0$, $L(\Delta(\omega_1), \omega_1)$ is negative. Let $\omega_2$, $\omega_2 > \omega_1$, be such that $L(\Delta(\omega_2), \omega_2)$ is equal to zero. Define $\omega_0 = \max(\omega, \omega_2)$, $D(\omega) = \Delta(\omega)$ for $\omega_0 \leq \omega \leq \alpha$, and $D(\omega) = \alpha$ for $\omega$ smaller than $\omega_0$.

It is easy to check that the $D(\omega)$ function thus defined indeed is the solution of the problem. \[ \blacksquare \]